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Bank privatization in Mexico - arguably one of the most
successful financial operations in recent years - has been
facilitated by a strong macroeconomic  stabilization  program,
legal and  financial  reform,  and the adoption  of clear objectives,
precise rules,  and transparent  procedures.
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This paper-  a product of the Financial Policy and Systems Division, Country Economics Department-
is part of a larger effort in the department to study issues in bank privatization. Copies of the paper are
available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Wilai
Pitayatonakam, room N9-003, extension 37664 (November 1992, 22 pages).
The recently completed privatization of Mexican  *  Legal reforn  should lead to structures that
commercial banks may be one of the most  encourage solid, efficient financial intermedia-
successful financial operations in recent years. In  tion.
13 months, the Mexican authorities were able to
sell 18 banks to private groups of Mexican  *  To encourage ample participation and to
investors for more than US$13 billion total-  ensure fairness, the privatization process must be
more than three times book value, and with a  trustworthy - with clear objectives, precise
price/earnings ratio of 14.5.  rules, and transparent procedures.
Guillermo Bames, Director General of the  * The mechanics of privatization should be
Development Planning Unit of the Ministry of  consistent with the legal framework and should
Finance and a member of the Privatization  be based on adequate, detailed preparation.
Committee that supervised the program, sets out
the preconditions, objectives, and main achieve-  *  The proceeds of privatization should be in
ments of the privatization program. He summa-  cash, which should be used to permanently
rizes the Mexican experience in nine lessons that  reduce government outlays.
may be relevant for developing countries consid-
ering similar exercises:  *  Common sense rules should be followed,
such as selling the small banks first, ensuring
The conditions suitable for privatization and  economic certainty and confidence, centralizing
the strength of the financial system are directly  management of the privatization program, and
related to the economy's general performance.  ensuring honesty and transparency in the pro-
Macroeconomic stability is essential for bank  cess.
privatization to succeed.
The overall lesson of the Mexican experi-
o  Bank privatization must be complemented  ence is that bank privatization should not be
by the structural transformation of the economy,  rushed. Mexico waited until 1990, when inflation
to improve efficiency and productivity.  was less than 20 percent a year and the banks
were strong (their numbers had been reduced and
* Financial reform must aim to strengthen  risky ventures restricted), while meticulous
competitive economic conditions and to enhance  preparation set the ground rules for transparent
the efficiency of the financial sector.  and effective procedures.
o  Bank privatization  requires  a new legal
framework, especially designed for private
institutions.
The  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the rmdings  of work  under  way  in  the  Bank.  An objective  of the  series
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The findings, interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
Produced  by the Policy  Research  Dissemninadon  CenterFinancial Policy and Systems Division
Country Economics Department
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The recently completed  privatization  of Mexican  commercial  banks may be classified
as one of tCe most successful  financial  operations of recent years.  Within the spate of
13 months, the Mexican  authorities were able to sell 18 banks to private groups of
Mexican investors for a total price of over US$13 billion.
Banks were nationalized  in Mexico in 1982 in a panicky response to the dual
economic shock of weakening  oil prices and rising real rates of interest.  During the
nationalization  period, the banking sector was consolidated  into fewer units and was
prevented from engaging  in risky and speculative  ventures.  This avoided the
accumulation  of large volumes of nonperforming  loans and facilitated  the process of
privatizatio.i. However, the smooth implementation  of the privatization  program was
based on the promotion of macroeconomic  stability, the pursuit of regulatory and
structural reform and the adoption  of clear objectives  and credible and transparent
procedures for the whole process.
Guillermo Barnes, Director General of the Development  Planning Unit of the
Ministry of Finance, was a member of the Privatization  Committee  that supervised  the
whole program.  In this paper, he sets out the preconditions,  objectives, and main
achievements  of the privatization  program.  The paper is based on two presentations
made by Dr Barnes to seminars organized by the Financial Policy and Systems
Division of the World Bank and by the Economic Development  Institute.
Dimitri Vittas
Principal Financial  Specialist
Financial  Policy and Systems DivisionIntroduction
This paper reviews briefly the Mexican  experience with bank privatization. The
success of bank privatization  in Mexico has been facilitated  by the macroeconomic
stabilization  policies  pursued over the past few years, the relatively strong financial  position
of Mexican  banks, and the good prospects for economic  growth and expansion  heralded by
the closer ties with the United States and Canada under the proposed North American Free
Trade Area (NAFTA).
But the effectiveness  of the program has also been based on the promulgation  of clear
principles and objectives  for the privatization  program and the adoption  of transparent  and
credible procedures.  The Mexican  experience is summarized  in 9 lessons that may be of
relevance for other developing  countries contemplating  similar exercises.
1.  The first and perhaps most important lesson is that privatizatlon conditions and
the strength  of the financial system are directly related to the general
performance of the  economy.  The Mexican economy grew at an annual average
rate  of 3.8% in 1989-1991  and the rate  of hastion  fell from almost 200% in 1987
to 18.0% In 1991. The sustained nature of economic growth marks the end of a
long period of economic crisis in Meaico and allowed a better privatization
framework  and a strong financial deepening.
1In 1983  the country  was facing  a stagnant  economy,  severe  macroeconomic
instability,  high inflation  rates, and an increase  ia the public  sector  debt.  These  were partly
the consequence  of imbalances  caused  by public  sector  policies,  increasing  real international
interest  rates, and the collapse  of oil prices  in the early 1980's.
The second  type of imbalances  were structural  inefficiencies  generated,  first, by an
oversized  public  sector  that owned  too many  state  enterprises  and overregulated  the economy
and, secondly,  by protectionist  trade policies  that reduced  foreign  competition  and weakened
industrial  competitiveness.
To solve  these  problems,  Mexico  adopted  a severe  adjustment  program  to stabilize  the
economy. During  1983-1987  fiscal  and monetary  policies  were tightened  with  a particular
emphasis  on fiscal  adjustment.  The program's  early achievements  were considerable:  the
primary  fiscal  balance,  which  excludes  interest  payments,  moved  from a deficit  of 7.3% of
GDP  in 1982  to a surplus  of 6% in 1991;  and public  expenditure  was reduced  sharply  dure-g
the same  period.
The administration  of President  Salinas,  which  took office  in December  1988,
condaued  and tuned  the prior administration's  economic  strategy  to emphasize
macroeconomic  stabilization,  structural  reforms,  and the reduction  of poverty.
2The stabilizaton  strategy  was  based  on momic  pWram  that included  dght
fiscal  and monetary  policies,  a revised  wage  and priee control  agreement  between  the
government,  business  and labor, and the strengthening  of the balance  of payments.
Stabilization  policies  were designed  to:
(i)  Increase  the public  sector  primary  balance,  which  averaged  a surplus  of 7% of
GDP in the period 1988-91.
(ii)  Renegotiate  Mexico's  foreign  debt to reduce  the problem  of excessive  Mexican
savings  transferred  abroad.
(iii)  Reduce  domestic  credit to the public  sctor and maintain  a crawling  exchange
rate in order  to further  lower  inflation.
(iv)  Maintain  relative  prices  according  to demand  and supply  conditions,  avoiding
indexing  and reducing  inflatdonary  expecations.
(v)  Obtain  economic  agreements  among  diffent  ctors  in order to distribute
evenly  the social  costs  of adjustment.
In November  1991,  the Government  sent  to Congren the budget  for 1992. This is
the first budget  in recent  history  which  shows  a public  soctor  suplus after including  interest
payments  on domestic  and foreign  debt. For 1992,  the pubec  sector  surplus,  excluding
futre  privatization  proceeds,  is etmated at 0.8% of GDP.
3Fiscal balance has helped achieve  a decline in the rate of inflation to less than 1
percent a mnnth.  During 1992, inflation is expected to be close to 10%.  Real GDP is
expected to grow at a rate of 3.5 percent.
Investment, the main source of economic  growth, showed an increase  of 10% in
1991. Private investment  is expected to grow at an annual rate of 12% in 1992. Real
expansion  of savings has permitted a large accumulation  of international  reserves and a
further increase of credit to the private sector.
The financial  sector reacted according to the general performance of the economy. In
1991 the percentage of financial  intermediation  to GDP reached 44%.  This figure was 33%
in 1985. Lower inflation, economic  growth and higher degree of stability increased the
demand for financial  assets.
2.  The second lesson Is that privatization has to be complemented with a general
structural  transformation  oriented to Improve efficiency and productivity.  The
financial  sector reforms have to be consistent with the general structural  trend of
the economy.
The Mexican macroeconomic  stabilizadon  program was complemented  with a
profound structural reform to increase  productivity  and improve overall market performance.
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8C:*:l600promotion,  privatization  of state  enerprises, deregulation,  fiscal  reform  and financial  sector
reform.
Today  Mexico  is an open and competitive  economy. Trade  lberalizaton policies
evolved  from a system  based  on import  perr":I and quantitative  restrictions  to a general
system  based  on tariffs. As a result,  resources  have  been  reallocated  to highly  competitive
sectors  and protection  rents have  been  eliminated. Companies  based  in Mexico  have  access
to international  raw materials  at competitive  prices. This has allowed  them  to become
internationally  competitive  and has fostered  non-oil  exports.
Foreign  investment  plays  an important  role in Mexico  as it complements  domestic
capital. To promote  foreign  investment,  regulations  were revised,  and administrative
procedures  for approving  foreign  investment  projects  were simplified. Foreign  investment  is
encouraged  since  it complements  domestic  investment  with new  technology,  efficient  market
strategies  and modem  management.  Foreign  investment  also  enhances  Mexican  export
capacity  and provides  domestic  employment.
Privatization  plays  an important  role in the overall  economic  strategy. Mexico  wants
a strong  and efficient  public  sector  based  on law and  justice, not on the ownership  of public
enterprises.  The public  sector  will maintain  ownership  and corntrol  only  of those  strategic
sectors  as defined  by the Mexican  Constitution.  The privatization  policy  has several
objectives:  to increase  aggregate  economic  efficiency  and productivity;  to promote  private
7investment  aitd technological  change;  to reduce  pressure  on the public  budget;  and to make
available  public  resources o increase  infrastructure  and social  investments.
From 1155  firms  owned  by the government  in 1982,  including  18 commercial  banks,
Mexico still maintains  ownership of  p,ublic  enterprises in 1992. In terms of value the
cumulative  sales have  reached  approximately  13 billion  dollars  (6% of GDP)  up to 1991.
These  resources  have  allowed  for better  economic  conditions  in the country.
Deregulation  is another  important  element  of the economic  strategy. The basic
objective  is to create  rules that promote  business  and entrepreneurial  activity. As long as an
economy  remains  overregulated,  it increases  the cost  of doing  business. The Mexican  goal is
to liberalize  the economy  and improve  resource  allocation  and efficiency. This  policy  has
helped  curb down  domestic  price increases  through  greater  competition.  More  generally,  it
has contributed  to the establishment  of a competitive  market  ircentive  structure  for the
private  sector.
The fiscal  reform  objective  is to incrase the efficiency  and equity  of the tax
structure. On the one hand, tax rates  have  been  reduced  to a mnaximum  level of 35%, which
is considered  an internationally  competitive  standard. On the other  hand, the tax base has
been  expanded  by including  sectors  which  were traditionally  excluded. Tax evasion  also has
been  reduced.Lower  rates  and a broader  base tend  to increse the equity  of the system. Tax
revenues  have  increased  as a percentage  of GDP. These  policies  have  fostered  the fiscal
performance  and the primary  public  sectoz  surpluses  observed  in the past years.
3.  The third lesson  concerns  directly  tbe fAanclal sector. The reforms have to
achieve  an Improvement  of competitive  economic  conditions  and enhance the
overall effi'ciency  of the financial  system.  The liberalization  has to include
operatlonal  and legal reforms.
In 1988,  Mexico  deregulated  interest  rates  by eliminating  controls  of rates and
maturities  on all traditional  bank instruments.  Restrictions  on loans  to the private  sector
were also eliminated  and lending  at below  market  interest  rates to the public  sector  was
discontinued.
Financial  reforms  included  changes  in the reserve  requirement  system. Reserve
requirements  on deposits  in pesos  were initially  replaced  by a 30 percent  liquidity  ratio,
which  was recently  reduced  to zero. Foreign  exchange  deposits  maintin a 15%  reserve
requirement.  Today, Govemment  instruments  held to satisfy  a voluntary  liquidity  ratio eamr
maiket  interest  rates  and are fully  tradeable.
To enhance  the operating  efficiency  of banks  and their  ability  to respond  to changing
market  conditions,  bank management  was given  more  flexibility  via the creation  of boards  of
9directors  with the power  to oversee  all operating  and investment  decisions  faced  by
management.
In December  1989,  to further  Arnancial  liberalization  and strengthen  banks  and other
institutions  involved  in credit  and stock  market  operations,  Congress  approved  wide-ranging
institutional  reforms. The measures  were intended  to increase  competition  and reduce  forced
market  segmentationt  by expanding  the scope  of permissible  activities  for different  types  of
institutions.  They  also  allowed  a greater  degree  of integration  in the delivery  of financial
services.
The reforms  also eliminated  government  regulation  of insurance  premiums  and
policies,  and deregulated  and simplified  the operation  of mutual  funds. Additionally,
restrictions  governing  foreign  investment  in financial  institutions  were relaxed.
In summary,  modernization  of the Mexican  financial  system  was  based  on the
liberalization  of instruments  and institutions  and was complemented  with  better  government
superision of financial  institutions.
4.  Prlvatization  of commercial  banks In Mexico  requhred  a new legal framework,
specially  deswed  for private Ilstutions.  This principle  provides  the fourth
lesson:  privatizatlon  of banks can be carried out only after having a solid and
wel defined  lel  structure.
10In 1990,  the Governmmet  launched  two major  iniiatves to allow  the pdvaon  of
commercial  banks  and to establish  the frmework for the formation  of integated financial
groups,  envisaged  as the maiorganitional  structure  of financial  markets. On May  2,
1990,  President  Salinas  submitted  a bill to Congress  to amend  Articles  28 and 123  of the
Constitution,  permitting  filll  privte ownership  of commercial  banks.
The new  Credit  Institutions  Law, enacted  in July 1990,  allows  commeril  bank to
be majority  owned  and controlled  by the private  sector. To ensure  Mexican  control  of
banks, four  classes  of bank shares  awe  provided  for:  "A  shares  which  have  to be at least  51
pcent  of the ordinary  capital,  can only  be held  by Mexican  individuals  and are related  to
the strategic  control  of the bank; "B' shares  that  can be up to 49%  of the ordinary  capital
depending  on the number  of  C' sar  issued  and can be held by Mexican  individuals,
Mexican  corporations,  and mutual  funds; 'C'  shares  that can  be up to 30% of the ordinaLy
capital  and can be held  by Mexican  individuals,  Mexican  cozporations  and foreign  investors;
and  L'  shares  which  represent  the additional  capital  and can be issued  in an amount  up to
30% of the ordinary  capital  - these  shares  can be held by the same investors  as C"  Shares,
but have  limited  voting  rights.
The law regulates  banking  and establishes  the terms under  which  the State  exerecis
supervi on and control  over the banldng  system. Prior to nationition,he  financial
system  was domiated by a few large banks  with strong  links to major  indusial goups.
The new  regulatory  provisions  are intended  to limit  the concentin  of credit risk, ensure
12the separation  of interests  between  banking,  industry  and commerce,  and avoid conflicts  of
interest  in the management  of banks. Strong  emphasis  is placed  on prudential  regulation  and
supervision  of banks. A comprehensive  system  for classifying  loans  according  to their
inherent  risk was implemented  with  a requirement  to create  specific  reserves  for loan losses
on nonperforming  loans. In 1991  Mexican  banks  were obliged  to constitute  over a two-year
period  general  reserves  for up to 1  % of the average  balance  of their  loan portfolio.
S.  The fifth lesson is that legal reforms should  lead to structures that encourage
solid and efficient  financlal  intermediation.
Mexico  adopted  a financial  legislation  which  opens  the possibility  of establishing  a
system  of 'universal  banking". The law pertaining  to Financial  Groups  regulates  and permits
the formation,  under  a common  structure,  of groups  of companies  performing  different
financial  functions  such  as banking,  insurance,  brokerage  and other  services. It ends  the
traditional  separation  of banking  from other types  of financial  activities,  and in particular,
allows  banks  and brokerage  houses  to come  under  the control  of a single  holding  company.
But in order to limit  the concentration  of risk, ensure  the adequacy  of capital,  prevent
the pyramidation  of capital  and prevent  conflicts  of interests  within  the groups,  the legislation
restricts  the presence  of more  than  one type of intermediary  within  a single  financial  group,
and prohibits  members  from investing  in each  other's or the holding  company's  stock.
126.  The  sixth lesson  Is related to the special  characteristics  of the privatization
process. In order to encourage  ample partlilpatlon and assure fairness, the
process must be trustworthy. Clear and precise rules for the entire  privatization
process are essential  for this purpose.
The privatization  of the banldng  system  was initiated  with a Presidential  decree  and
had the following  objectives:
- Create  a more  efficient  and competitive  financial  system.
- Guarantee  diversified  participation  and ownership  of banks  to promote
investment  in the financial  sector  and guard  against  ownership  concentration.
- Ensure  high  ethical  standards  and competence  of bank management  and obtain
adequate  capitalization  levels.
- Ensure  Mexican  control  of banks,  but without  the exclusion  of foreign
involvement.
- Promote  decentralization  and regional  participation  in the banking  institutions.
- Obtain  a fair price for the institutions  in accordance  with valuations  based  on
homogeneous  and objective  criteria.
- Achieve a balanced financial  system.
- Promote  fair and healthy  financial  and banking  practices.
13To oversee  the whole  process  and bring  it to fruition,  a Bank  Privatization  Committee
was fonned  by Presidential  decree  and made  responsible  for the entire  process. The
Committee  included  govenment  officials  from all areas related  to financial  activity. The
main responsibilities  assigned  to this group  were the following:
- establish  criteria  and general  policies  for the process;
- fornulate a specific  strategy  for the sale of each  bank;
- assure  transparency  of the process  with  periodic  communications  to the public  at
large;
- hire external advisers as needed; and
- benefit  from international  experiences  in banking  privatization.
7.  The mechanics  of the privatization  process  should  be consistent  with the legal
framework  and specific  guidelines  of the banking system. The seventh lesson  Is
that adequate preparation of the mechanics  of privatization  should  be made
before  starting  the process.
The Mexican  bank  privatization  process  consisted  of four main  stages. The first,
preparatory  actions,  included:  qualification  and selection  of the bidders  by the Committee;
writing  each  bank's sale  prospectus;  and announcing  the auction  and its rules.
14The selection  of bidding  groups  aimed  to ensure  that potential  investors  were
experienced  and of high moral  standing  and were able to male a positive  contribution  to the
future  growth  of the banks. Only  approved  groups  were  allowed  to participate  in the
auctions  for each  bank. More than  44 groups  were approved  and they  presented  in total 133
solicitations  to acquire  a bank. Each  bidding  group  consisted  of a core group  that was
allowed  to invest  in "A" shares. No foreign  investors  were included  in the bidding  groups,
although  after the completion  of the privatization  process,  foreign  investors  were invited  to
participate  in the ownership  of different  banks.
During  the first stage, several  valuations  were prepared  for all banks. Each  bank had
an accounting  valuation  prepared  following  standard  criteria. In addition,  two independent
financial  valuations  were made  for each bank  with the assistance  of external  advisers  of
international  prestige. Obtaining  objective  valuations  of banks  is always  a difficult  exercise
because  of the information  problems  involved  in assessing  the performance  of commercial
and industrial  loans. However,  unlike  the cufrent  situation  in most  developing  countries,
Mexican  banks  were fortunate  in that at the time  of the privatization  process  they had
relatively  low volumes  of nonperforming  loans. To some  extent,  this was the result  of the
past imposition  of heavy  reserve  and investment  requirements  on banks  that forced  them  to
allocate  a disproportionate  amount  of their resources  to government  bonds. In addition,
during  the  nationalization  period, banks  were encouraged  to consolidate  their  operations  and
to build  adequate  reserves  against  loan losses. The number  of banks  was reduced  from 60 at
isthe time of nationalization  to 18, of which  6 were nationwide  institutions,  7 were
multiregional  banks  and 5 were regional  banks.
Once  the auction  was announced,  the second  stage  began. It consisted  of the due
diligence  process  carried  out by each  bidder. Qualified  bidders  had access  to the process  if
they made  a deposit  and signed  a letter of confidentiality,  relating  to all information  obtained.
It is important  to point  out that  equal  access  was  given to all bidders  to information,
bank visits  and management  interviews.  The committee  supervised  the due diligence
activities  during  the whole  process.
The auction  itself  was the third step  of the process. After  the due diligence  process
was completed,  qualified  bidders  presented  their  bids. Fairness  was  guaranteed  by the
presentation  of aU  bids  at the same  time  in the presence  of public  notaries. The Committee
reviewed  the bids  and selected  a winner  based  on the highest  price offered,  provided  that this
price was higher  than  the valuations  determined  previously  by the Committee.  In case of a
tie, the following  items  were considered  to award the bank: business  plan, capitalization  plan
and the regional  presence  of the bidders. All winning  bids  were those  with the highest  price
offered.
The final  stage  in the process  was the sale  itself. The sale was decided  by the
spending-financing  commission  of the federal  government,  following  the privatization
16committee's  recommendation.  The government  transferred  its shares  to the winning  group
once  the group  had paid the total value  offered.
Thirteen  months  after initiating  the selling  process,  control  of all 18  banks  has been
sold  for US$ 13.5  billion. The prices  that have  been  achieved  are a result  of the state  of the
banking  system  and of each  individual  bank. In all cases, the prices  have  been  higher  than
the valuations  obtained  by the external  advisors. The weighted  average  price-earnings  ratio
amounted  to 14.5. In the U.S. and Europe  an average  of comparative  bank acquisitions  in
the last five years  reached  a price-earnings  ratio  of 14. The weighted  price-book  value  ratio
was 3.08 versus  an international  average  of 2.2.  The price range that has been  obtained
reflects  the health  of the banking  system,  the modern  legal  framework,  and positive
expectations  on the future  performance  of the Mexican  economy.
In addition  to the quantitative  results  mentioned  above,  other  important  objectives
have  been  obtained. In particular,  a diversified  ownership  of the capital  stock  of the banks
has been  achieved. More than 130,000  private  investors,  including  employees  through
special  trusts, have  participated  in the process,  while  no individual  investor  has more  than
10%  of the stock  of any bank.
Additionally,  the regional  presence  of the banks  has been  strengthened.  The new
bank owners  come  from aU  states  in the country. They  will link the banks  with their  local
economies  and customers.
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MERCAMilL  Jun-01-91  $611.20  1.19%  $297.6 (a)  2.66 x  $62.2  (a)  12.73 x  $69.3  11.43 x
8ANPAIS  Jon-14-91  $544.99  IQO.00%  $130.1  (a)  3.03 x  $30.7 (k)  17.73 x  $24.6  22.S  x
CREMI  Ju-21-91  $743.29  66.70%  $329.9  (a)  3.40 x  $51.3  (a)  21.87 x  $41.7  26.90 x
CONFIA  Ago-M2-91  $592.26  78.68%  $304.0 (b)  3.73 x  $53.9 (1)  13.52 x  $108.6  10.44 a
BANORIE  Ago-9W-91  $223.22  66.00%  $83.7  (b)  4.04 x  $14.3  (b)  23.65 x  $13.4  13.35 a
BANCRESER  Ago-16-91  $4S2.13  100.00%  $163.5 (b)  2.60 x  $1.4  (b)  50.45  z  $48.6  8.75 x
DANAMEX  Ago-23-91  S9,74&98  70.72%  $5,242.1  (c)  2.62 x  $1,233.0 (c)  11.15 A  $g,264.1  (a)  10.90 x
BANCOMER  Oct-25-91  $5,544.21  56.00%  $5,111.3  (d)  2.99 a  $975.9  (d)  15.67 x  S,104.1  13.85 x
BCII  No-03-91  $571.36  100.00%  $328.4  (d)  2.67 x  $39.38  (d)  22.31 x  535.60  24.67 t
SERFIN  Enc-24-92  $2,32.74  53.00%  $2,061.00  (e)  2.69 x  $375.29  (e)  14.77 a  $493.00  11.29 x
COMERMEX  Feb01-92  $2,706.01  66.54%  $1,059.24  (e)  3.73 x  $197.29  (e)  20.61 x  $235.0D  17.31 x
SOMEX  Feb-23-92  $1,576.53  31.62%  $695.57  (I)  3.31 x  $105.20  (f)  21.25 x  S150.00  35.33  a
ATLANTICO  Mag-27-92  $1,469.16  68.4%  $4070  (5)  5.33 x  $119.50  (g)  17.95 x  $223.00  9.41 x
PROMEX  Abr-03-92  $1,014.47  66.00%  $383.09  (g)  4.25 x  $98.50  (g)  16.53 a  S135W  13.16 x
BANORO  Abr-10-92  $1,137.51  66.03%  $436.25  (l)  3.9S a  $132.96  (h)  11.27 x  $174.30  11.26 x
BANORTE  Jun-12-92  $1,77S.78  66.00%  $633.05 (i)  4.25 x  $213.21  (s)  12.62 x  $230.40  11.63 x
INTERNACIONAL  Jun-26-92  $3,436.92  51.00%  s937.05  (i)  2.95 x  (S33.20)  (i)  N.A.  $236.70  12.32  x
BANCEN  Jul-03-92  $569.38  66.31%  $281.70  (i)  4.65 x  $120.81  (i)  10.55  s  $120.00  10.93 x
SISTEMA  $37,356.45  $19,010.76  $3,697.71  $4,696.75
*)W4US9bl.  _Ihmpme  baz35.33  50.48  26.90
b)hJut.N99M.  Mb_  2.60  11.20  6.75
*h  bsquo1e  1"1.  Avaw  3.49  17.50  14A5
*) hDseeo  MI.  St:  rd DeYitbm  0.78  9.71  5.20 OhJmmy IWl.52
in  Fh  tsn  Wedgod  A  ora  3.08  14.34  12.46
I)  hof  Mau  do992.rA
1* b  pg  M.  TMrftb  M  m  - "gw  t41  bfnpsi6  mo3  3-pceni  6of13 I)  b  w  1"1.  hi  twpks
oh  Cs39 Fadie  hd_isO_bdm_ed  eOdfed_m_s a  ) l l  u m  b s d  e  l  . p  s s  w a d . u  ..  i  f  s . I  b  a  l  e l ,  C m s  a  e  i  a u c a l a d 3  w  q c e  a l  e  , o l i  m  i  m  l i  u  a  p ~ f e s
_  a Ui.IudS.  The eighth principle  is that sales have to be In cash and privatizatlon  revenues
have to be used on permanent welfare  Improvements.
Privatization  should  be an irreversible  process  that intends  to transfer  the ownership
of assets  from the government  to the private  sector  on a once  and for all basis. Selling  for
cash is a transparent  way  of cutting  the relation  between  the firms  and the government,
prevent  future  unpaid  balances,  or granting  some  type  of government  credit  to finance  the
purchase  of the firms.
Once  the sale is completed  one has to decide  the destiny  of the transitory  rwienues  of
the sale, in order to have  a permanent  impact  on public  finances. Prudence  suggests  that
once  and for all revenues  should  not be used  to finance  current  spending. These  resources
should  be used  to reduce  government  outlays  on a permanent  basis. In the Mexican  case the
stock  of internal  debt as a percentage  of GDP was  reduced  from 24.4% in December  1990  to
17%  in December  1991,  using  privatization  proceeds. This is expected  to decline  further  to
13%  in 1992. A smaller  public  debt reduces  government  outlays  on interest  payments  and
allows  a transfer  of government  outlays  to social  programs.
9.  The last lesson is that one has to foUlow  common sense rules  to have a succesfdl
privatization  experience. Some  of these rules are:
199.1  Start privatizing  small  fhrms  first.  There  are several  reasons  to be prudent  about
the timing  and the sequence  of any privatization  process. Learning  the technical  facts
involved  takes  time  and it is important  to minimize  risks. Mistakes  made  seUing  a small
firm are not as important  as those  privatizing  a large bank, the telephone  company  or a
major  airline.
9.2  Ensure economic  certainty and confidence  through macroeconomic  stabilization
and market-friendly  regulatory  and structural reform.  These  conditions  allow  public
sector  firms  to be sold  at higher  prices. The timing  and planning  of the strategy  requires
both  a stabilization  program  and a privatization  scheme.
9.3  Centralize  the management  of the whole  process. In practice  this means  having  a
single  responsible  office  which  would  preside  over the firm's board  and the general  manager,
would  establish  the proper  strategy,  would  deal  with all potential  buyers,  and would
supervise  all legal requirements.
9.4  Ensure honesty  and transparency  in the whole process. Credibility  has to be
gained  and people  have  to know  that everything  is done  according  to the law and honestly.
Detailed  information  has to be given  to the mass media,  which  include  characteristics  of the
buyer, forms  of payment,  etc.  Congress  and the General  Comptroller  must  be briefed  on a
continuous  basis.
20Conclusion
In conclusion,  it can be claimed  that the bank privatization  process  in Mexico  has
achieved  all its short  term  objectives  and has also laid the foundations  for the pursuit  of the
longer  term  objectives.
Among  the former,  the privatization  process  has succeeded  in ensuring  Mexican
control  of banks  with  diversified  ownership  and regional  participation.  It has also obtained
high  but fair prices  for all the banks. As regards,  longer  term  objectives,  bank privatization
has laid the foundations,  in conjunction  with the reform  of bank and financial  regulation,  for
creating  an efficient  and competitive,  but balanced,  financial  system,  enhancing  operating
efficiency  and ethical  standards,  and developing  fair and healthy  banling and financial
practices.
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